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Abstract
When philosophers deal with the issue of the difference between human and animal beings,
there is always a double ‘‘we’’ that imposes itself: ‘‘we’’ know that ‘‘we’’ are different. In
order to resist these ‘‘we’s’’ the author has explored certain situations in which human and
animals work together, and more extensively the everyday practices of cow and pig breeders.
Interviewing the breeders, however, highlights an important issue: might the question of
‘‘the’’ difference, as philosophers have outlined it, be of interest to those who work with
animals? Letting them construct ‘‘their’’ questions, we learn that these practices are best
described in terms of achievement. Therefore, the questions that breeders think should be
addressed are not the differences between human and non-human beings but rather the
differences between situations, which offer both humans and animals different opportunities
to accomplish subjectivities.
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Introduction
A
t the end of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes
that if a lion could speak, we would not be able to understand it.
The dog and horse trainer and philosopher Vicky Hearne remarks,
with the wisdom of rigorous impertinence, that if a lion tamer read
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Wittgenstein, s/he couldn’t help but be astonished: ‘‘What does he mean? That if
my lion Sudan started talking to me, we would stop being able to understand
each other?’’ (Hearne, 1994, p. 168). It is perhaps here that the major difficulty
philosophers have with the animal question is outlined. There is always a ‘‘we’’
that imposes itself: an enrolment, a collective capture in a problem whose terms,
which are given from the outset, we have to accept.
For my part I feel much more at ease with the sad observation made to the
sociologist Jocelyne Porcher by a worker at an industrial pig farm: ‘‘personally, I
believe that if animals could speak, we would get shouted at every day’’ (Porcher
in Despret, 2007b). I feel all the more at ease as this suggestion takes on
significance in contrast to what breeders say in those farms where humans and
animals live in relation to each other, have a mutual knowledge and take
seriously what breeding means: ‘‘we don’t stop talking with our animals’’. I’ll
come back to this.
Of course, one could always envisage a simple explanation, setting out – still
with Vicki Hearne – down the path of humour rather than that of denunciation:
philosophers have an enormous problem of rivalry when it comes to language.
Thus, she remarks, ‘‘human philosophers tend to talk strangely when the topic
of parrots comes up, as if they believe that their stature depends on the
diminished status of parrots’’ (Hearne, 1994, p. 3). ‘‘Because’’, she continues,
‘‘the problem of parrots is that they need to control the exchanges. You want to
engage them in conversation, a conversation that rapidly takes on the
appearance of an IQ test, and you find yourself led astray by a habit common
to all talking parrots: their refusal to let another individual choose the topic of
conversation.
You go up to a parrot, and he’s probably in a cage and you’re not, so you feel
pretty superior, maybe you even think you can feel sorry for the parrot, and you
ask the parrot how he is, and he says something gnomic like, ‘so’s your old
man’ or ‘how fine and purple are the swallows of the late summer’. Then the
parrot looks at you in a really interested, expectant way, to see if you’re going to
keep your end up (y). You start trying to figure out what the parrot means by
it, and there you are. You haven’t a hope of reintroducing whatever topic you
had in mind. That’s why philosophers keep denying that parrots can talk, of
course, because a philosopher really likes to keep control of a conversation’’
(ibid., p. 5).
The same thing could be said of behaviourists, although conversation would
not be at the centre of their problem of control, even less at the centre of what
really interests them. The fact that no parrot has ever spoken to a behaviourist
testifies to this. The reason for the silence of parrots in this kind of apparatus is
simple enough and makes Wittgenstein right, in part – providing one takes into
account not the point of view of the human but the hypotheses the parrots seem
to forge. In view of the situation suggested to them, they deduce that if they
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having succeeded in the miracle of having a conversation with them, has shown
– parrots have a pragmatic rather than a referential conception of language.
They cannot speak if they don’t feel they are speaking to someone. And this
someone is cruelly lacking in the behaviourist apparatus. Under the banner of
objectivity, everything is constructed in such a fashion as to render
the researcher as impersonal as possible, to make of him a being replaceable
by whosoever, which is precisely the contrary of what defines a person.
In the light of the work of Irene Pepperberg, the psychologist who succeeded
in making parrots speak and be understood (Pepperberg, 1995, pp. 11–15),
another reason can be suggested. Her practice shows us that to teach a being to
speak presupposes not only a tolerance of but also a profound interest in
misunderstandings. All parents know that the teaching and learning of language
requires, at the outset, that meanings be proposed for things that don’t
necessarily have any. When Alex, the first grey parrot from Gabon to
collaborate in Pepperberg’s research, inadvertently produced a new signifying
sound, the researchers would act as if this sound was intentional and respond to
this new act of language as if Alex had wanted to demand something or
comment intentionally. The effect of the misunderstanding, of the ‘‘as if’’, is that
a sound produced accidentally can thus become a word that signifies something
for the parrot because it has signified something for the researcher. Meanings
are constructed in a constant movement of attunement, which makes them
emerge. This strategy, which tunes up meanings, which gives them and adjusts
them, is inscribed more broadly in Pepperberg’s work in an apparatus that
redistributes control. The fact that the parrot may or may not have had the
intention of producing the new combination is not important, Pepperberg
explains, because we simply want to show the parrot that phrases can have
meaning and that they can be used to control, or at least influence, one’s
environment and the actions of those who take care of him or her. Besides, we
know that for birds, learning a language cannot be summed up in learning how
to sing, but also in learning how the song must be used. Language must be
learned/taught in its pragmatic function: it is an effective means of acting and of
making others act.
From this perspective and to keep the parrot interested, the researchers gave it
control of its rewards. A correctly named or appropriately described object
would be offered but sometimes Alex wouldn’t want it, and would prefer
something else: a titbit or to go for a walk. The researchers would comply with
good grace. The reward, then, translates for Alex as the right to ‘‘want’’ and to
take a position in relation to what is offered to him. For the scientists, this
redistribution of control and this more equitable apportionment of ‘‘wanting’’
translates the success of their apparatus: Alex testifies to his capacity to
accomplish tasks that were hitherto considered as exceeding the capacities of
non-humans. Not only would he speak, describe, count, classify objects in
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also able to use speech so as to influence the behaviour of others: ‘‘come here’’,
‘‘I want to go to that place’’, ‘‘no’’, ‘‘I want this’’. By restating and inverting the
question of control – no longer a solution requiring purification but a problem
to be negotiated – the laboratory authorized a superb exchange of properties
between the researchers and their subject.
Consequently, one can understand how a conception of objectivity, defined as
the refusal to suggest the meanings perceived momentarily by oneself alone (this
corresponds to one of the possible figures of subjectivity), has rendered the
learning of speech by parrots impossible. An infant doubtless wouldn’t have
managed any better. More generally, one should consider that the manner in
which behaviourists consider language – and the regime of proofs that testify to
one’s competence to use it – is lacking one condition essential to permitting
linguistic exchange: the possibility of misunderstandings. Without this
possibility of continually adjusting and negotiating what is understood, it is
the understanding itself that is compromised,1 because exchange, pragmatically
speaking, can only be achieved when there is a continuous reprisal of
translations and betrayals of meaning. If Sudan the lion could speak, would
this ‘‘we’’ of ‘‘we understand [each other]’’ still be possible? Constructed with
her tamer through the invention of a dialect,2 a constant attention towards the
other, through doubts and vital risks engaging them both and above all through
the possibility of not understanding everything, they would both be referred to
another mode of existence.
By identifying language use with modes of existence, one might rediscover the
celebrated response that Daniel Dennett opposed to Wittgenstein, arguing that
if a lion could speak it would no longer be lion enough to teach us anything on
the subject of ‘‘lioness’’. A priori, Dennett’s response might have no interest
other than that of demonstrating once again the lack of seriousness with which
philosophers treat the question of the ‘‘we’’. A lion that was able to speak would
not be able to do so in the name of the ‘‘we’’ of lions. This is a singular decision.
Certainly it rests on a burdensome conception of the naturalness of animals,
which explains the decision without being able to justify it. The mode of
existence of lions is subordinated to that of an essence ‘‘lioness’’, guaranteed by
the identity of the species and the stability of its repertoire of behaviour. But let’s
leave that problem, which in the last instance only translates some tired old
reflexes faced with the menace of the blurring of the frontier between humans
and animals.
However, the question could become interesting if it were posed concretely
from the point of view of the lions, not in an abstract and general manner.
Would a lion that speaks still be recognized as a lion by its conspecifics? What
matters, from the point of view of a lion, to make it say to another lion ‘‘you are
still one of us’’? This is the problem that researchers attempting to reintroduce
captive animals into their natural milieu encounter every day, as they are
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groups, as we see with chimpanzees. But if this is indeed the way in which
certain ethologists or primatologists can pose the question – and I’m thinking
here of the manner in which Shirley Strum proposed to interrogate her baboons
by subordinating her questions to what matters for the baboons – one will
notice that Dennett approaches it differently: we must ourselves be the judges of
what it is that ensures that a lion has something to teach us on the subject of
what it is to be a lion. That is to say, we have slid surreptitiously from the
question of representing to the question of the representative.3 As a consequence
of this, the ‘‘we’’ that designates us as ‘‘teaching us something on the subject of
lioness’’ becomes totally abstract, in the same way that the obvious fact that
lions can teach us nothing if they are not well represented by the persons that
the lions make speak disappears.4 We will know nothing about lions if we
follow Wittgenstein and Dennett because the latter are evidently not pertinent
spokesmen for lions, of what makes a world for them, what makes them active,
what frightens them, what makes a ‘‘we’’ for them when they hunt together,
even when they participate in a circus act. The question is not what is a lion, but
‘‘how does one become a lion’’, not only in the lion community, not only in the
lion’s species, but also ‘‘how does one become a lion’’ in the work of scientists
constructing what it is to be a lion. This is a question of becoming: of that of
which the animal is rendered capable by the apparatuses that interrogate it, by
the narratives that guide these apparatuses, by the hours of work spent
observing them. It is sufficient simply to compare what we knew about baboons
30 years ago and what we can say about them today.5 Scientists have found it
necessary to properly learn from them, to pass from the question of the
representative animal (which, for many reasons and in many senses, was the
baboon of the initial research) to that of the good representer: how can what
I say about lions or baboons be authorized by them?
To return to those animals whose entry into language makes philosophers so
uncomfortable, the appropriate response to this question is the one that best
testifies to the success of Pepperberg’s project with Alex. It is the question that
the researcher poses at the end of her work with the parrot: what does Alex
really authorize me to say about parrots? I cannot, she says, affirm that all
parrots talk, nor that all the grey parrots of Gabon talk. Alex is not
representative of parrots; no parrot could be. The givens appear to us instead
as a means of sketching out the competences that can, with the appropriate
environmental support, figure in the list of capacities of the species. Here then is
not what parrots are but what they might be rendered capable of.
This rendering capable at the same time indicates what is at work here: Alex
talks because Pepperberg desires it and demands it of him, and because she was
able to subordinate her desire to what makes sense for Alex in the matter of
speaking. She was able to negotiate with Alex over what in speech could interest
him.6 Alex talks because for diverse reasons his desire overlaps with that of
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successfully imposed by scientists, but in the name of a ‘‘we’’ constituted by the
assemblage of a parrot and human beings equipped with an apparatus aimed at
making the parrot talk well.
Is this to say that one might have to renounce all generalization,
compromising one of the requirements for doing science? Generalization is
always possible, but it is constructed in another way: it is constructed bit by bit.
In 1990, Kyaro, a young male aged three and a half months, and Alo, a seven-
month-old female, came to join the team. Interrogated under the same
conditions, they could testify to the possibility that the competences of Alex
are present in other grey parrots. Consequently, this generalization bit by bit,
from success to success, is no longer expressed in terms of what parrots are, but
in terms of the possibilities that the apparatus could actualize. Generalization
has changed sides: it is no longer on the side of the parrot neither on the side of
the researcher, who ought to represent an anyone guaranteeing objectivity: now
it qualifies the appropriate apparatuses.
In this way, by resisting the possibility of letting itself be captured in its
alternatives, Pepperberg’s practice escapes the two fatal and perfectly foresee-
able traps of subjectivity. By taking an interest in what constitutes the
appropriateness of a material apparatus that transforms those it interrogates,
and by fully agreeing to situate herself in a regime of transformations and
accomplishments that mingle with and give form to desires, the question of the
subjectivity of the researcher ‘‘influencing’’ the competences of her subject no
longer has any reason to cause concern. The question is now about the
effectiveness of the apparatus, the researcher’s desire no longer being anything
but one of the modes of this efficacity. The apparatus reveals nothing, it testifies
instead to the power of the transformations themselves. As a corollary of this
resistance, the question of the subjectivity of the parrot no longer has much
sense, short of restricting it and rendering it very concrete. If the parrot can talk,
we do not know what it is, nor what parrotness is, nor anything about the point
of view of parrots on the world. But we do learn in a viable manner about its
point of view on the apparatus. We learn something about its point of view on
the new materials with which it will make a world: colour boxes, numbers,
words, a grammar, forms, humans and abstractions. In the same manner that
the refusal to talk, in other apparatuses, constitutes an expression of the parrot’s
opinion in relation to the relevance of what it is asked, the fact that it
engages with, accepts and actively transforms what becomes a part of its
world, translates an extension of this world and therefore an extension of its
subjectivity as ‘‘parrot-with-human’’.
It is not simply by chance that I have summonsed some very particular
situations in order to resist this ‘‘we’’ imposed by certain philosophical practices
(which returns so easily when it is a matter of animals, as if on this subject we
could only be in agreement). They are situations in which humans and animals
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accomplish things together. I could say it again in other terms, by taking up
anew those by which I designated Alex’s accomplishment: they are situations of
the extension of subjectivity.7 What makes us ‘‘one of us’’ for beings of one
species will, like a proposition, overlap with what will become ‘‘one of us’’ for
beings of another species.8
The same situations can be encountered in certain practices of domestication
characteristic of the work of breeders. They place animals one nevertheless has
the habit of expecting little from (besides the fact of feeding us), such as cows
and pigs, on centre stage.9 Although the question of ‘‘working together’’ seems
less evident to breeders than to animal tamers or a scientist whose practice is
very close to the latter, their testimony seems to me to describe a very similar
adventure, an adventure in the course of which subjectivities overlap, are
transformed, actualized and extended to the subjectivity of the other. In tackling
the question of subjectivity and its possible confiscation today, I have all the
more reason to appeal to these breeders. One of my motives for accepting the
sociologist Jocelyne Porcher’s offer to work with her on the relations involved in
breeding10 was principally linked to this desire to resist the ‘‘we’’ that
philosophers impose on us when they undertake to represent us in order to
decree the difference between animals and us.
As it was a matter of resisting the ‘‘we’’ that academic knowledge imposes
in order to constitute the difference between animals and humans, it was first
of all necessary to learn to present ourselves properly and address others
properly. On the one hand, it was necessary to learn to address breeders not as
properly representative beings but as good representers. For instance, this was
what guided the choice of those we encountered: we sought breeders who we
thought would be both interesting and interested by our questions.11 On the
other hand, it was a matter of not seeking to impose ‘‘our’’ problem as common
a priori.
In fact, ‘‘our’’ problem was constituted by the convergence of three problems
whose solutions we wished to experiment with. The first was that of Jocelyne
Porcher. In the course of her previous enquiries she had arrived at the conclusion
that an interesting and reliable manner of talking about the relations between
breeders and their animals was to consider that they were working together. To
consider that humans and animals work together permits the multiple aspects of
their relationship to be thought in a way that other concepts cannot grasp: the
judgement that animals make about humans, in the form of the ‘‘judgement of
relation’’, the contrast between exploitation and collaboration, the question of
the sentiment of accomplishment, that of gift and of exchange, etc. Now, if in
her previous work Jocelyne Porcher had heard multiple anecdotes that showed
that animals actively collaborate in the work of their breeders, take the initiative
to make it possible, have an autonomous part in this work, the question could
not have been posed. When she asked a breeder, ‘‘don’t you feel that your
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by stating, ‘‘no, the animals don’t work. It is us who work’’. And yet, the
anecdotes testified to the contrary.
The second and the third problems were mine. I was feeling more and more
acutely irritated in hearing philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and
anthropologists define, with crude generalizations, the specificity of humans
and their difference from animals. There was clearly a double ‘‘we’’ in this story,
which posed a problem: first, a ‘‘we know full well’’ and then, a ‘‘we are
different’’. How could this ‘‘we’’ impose itself so self-evidently if not as the effect
of an academic strong-arm tactic? I wanted to break with this ‘‘we’’ and find out
how people who live with animals, who make animals live and who live by
them could themselves envisage this difference. I was going to ask them to create
this breach in the ‘‘we’’.
On the other hand – this was my second problem – I was more and more
driven to call into question the manner in which research investigations are
carried out and had for some years been looking for other apparatuses, ones
which would substitute a research for pertinence and interest for the search for
truth. The necessity for me to modify my research practice had already imposed
itself on me during an investigation I had carried out at the start of the 1990s in
the refugee camps of the former Yugoslavia, when I had realized that the effects
of the investigation risked stigmatizing the people I had been questioning, and
would thus contribute to a deterioration in their condition. To address people as
refugees, an identity in which they could not recognize themselves, for example,
only repeated the process of exclusion [by which they had become refugees
in the first place].12 Anonymity prolonged what one could call a regime of
insults – ‘‘you refugees’’ – a regime of insults that was all the more violent
because of the fact that being called or considered a refugee (the undeserving,
nobodies, people of the third zone, someone from the other side of the world, to
cite just some of the insults) was experienced by those people as extremely
disabling. A first move then was to break with the practice of anonymity to the
extent that it only reinforced the feeling of ‘‘being nobody’’ and deepened the
contrast between ‘‘them’’ and ‘‘us’’.
Anonymity, this unquestioned condition of most research investigations, is
not simply a characteristic of the research process. From the outset it translates
a certain type of relationship and a certain manner of defining those whom one
addresses. In other words, it suggests a very specific kind of subjectivation.
To break with anonymity is, consequently, to break both with certain
manners of presenting oneself and with the way in which one suggests that
others present themselves, or, indeed, get represented. Consequently, I had every
reason to want to prolong this rupture in less dramatic contexts: it is by erasing
one’s name that one becomes the ‘‘subject’’ of an investigation. I understand
‘‘subject’’ here in the way that psychologists designate ‘‘whosoever’’ comes to
occupy the position of the uninitiated in research. Anonymity plays an essential




Vinc iane Despre t
exceeds that of a ‘‘feel free to say what you want’’, and even ‘‘don’t be afraid to
talk’’ which is given as motive: feel free, because actually what you say will have
no consequences. It only takes a couple of seconds, though, to realize how
people will perceive themselves and translate the situation when they are told
that what they say will have no consequences.
The result, the stake, even, of anonymity, is to produce a radical asymmetry of
expertises: on the one hand there is the ‘‘researcher–author’’ – the author of
questions, of interpretations of hypotheses, of constructions of problems; on the
other, there is a social actor: witness, informant, someone having opinions,
beliefs and representations for which the researcher will take charge of the
analysis. For example, scientists cite their colleagues by name, whereas the
witnesses they talk to are all anonymous. This is only one of the many ways in
which the asymmetry of expertises is recalled and the possibilities of being
authorized to think and of being recognized as putting oneself to the test of
thought, indeed of being engaged by what one says, is maintained. Authors are
cited, given names, while one lists the interchangeable holders of opinions. The
researcher is engaged by what he or she affirms, the witness knows in advance
that what he or she will say engages him or her in nothing, because what he or
she says are only representations, consigned from the outset by the stamp of his
or her distance from the truth. Such practices bring back the difference between
representers and representatives incessantly.
In fact, this difference is only the symptom of a more general situation of
which certain research habits are characteristic. They rest on a procedure that
demands submission from those who are questioned: submit to questions,
submit to the inevitable play of interpretations that will judge one’s testimony,
one’s beliefs, indeed one’s unconscious motives, submit to the theories that guide
research, submit to the problem that is imposed on them and to the manner in
which the researcher constructs and defines it. The subject is summonsed by a
problem that he or she often has nothing to do with, or in any case has nothing
to do with the manner in which the problem is defined, just as the researcher
isn’t usually preoccupied by the manner in which his problem may or may not
be a problem for whoever it summons. And most of the time the subject
mobilized in this way will agree to respond to questions without calling into
question their interest, their appropriateness or even their politeness,13 as,
evidently, the scientist ‘‘knows better’’. In this regard parrots are less aware of
the prestige of science and are not worried about resisting and expressing their
opinions.
We therefore sought the form of an apparatus that would be best placed to
break with what always risks producing submission in the research process. The
solution amounted to exploring the place where those who we would be
questioning would be best placed to ‘‘object’’, to addressing them where they
would be getting on with their affairs and therefore where they would be both
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was going to lead us to the proposition of a solution: Jocelyne Porcher’s
question could not be posed; as for mine, if I took seriously my own reticence
with regard to the relevance of the response, I ought to have envisaged that the
question itself of the difference between humans and animals was perhaps not
relevant for the animal breeders. We therefore asked them to help us construct
our questions.
‘‘In the course of the investigations I have carried out with animal breeders, I
(Jocelyne Porcher) have often heard anecdotes, stories, sometimes even ways of
talking which suggested that animals, in a certain manner, collaborated in the
breeders’ work. Now, when I have tried to raise this question directly and in
more depth with the breeders, I have encountered resistance or incomprehen-
sion. Evidently it is not a good question to ask. But the recurrence of testimonies
on this subject encourages me to persevere. So, in your opinion, as a breeder,
how do you think I should construct my question so that it has a chance of being
understood and of being interesting?’’ Similarly, the question that was my
responsibility, that of difference, was formulated in this way: ‘‘we have observed
that the difference between humans and animals is a question that a large
number of philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists have
looked into. Evidently this question interests them. In other respects, obviously,
the answers that they have given are different from those that would be
obtained if one asked other people, who have other relations with animals, and
this contrast interests us. Now, if this question agitates academics we are not
sure that they are particularly interested in breeders nor that the question is
appropriate. So, for you as breeders, how do you think we should construct and
ask the question for it to have a chance both of interesting those we ask and of
receiving interesting answers?’’
Formulated in this way, these two questions show what we have tried to
construct and how it modifies the way in which research investigations are
traditionally undertaken. We know that problems are only interesting if they
interest: we therefore had to ask the breeders themselves to construct the interest
they might take in our investigations, even if – this was the risk – we were told
that our problems are not interesting, relevant or shareable. Thus, for example,
when Maria Celeste Guimaraes, an elderly breeder from North Portugal,
mischievously interrupts her younger friend by stating ‘‘the difference between
human [l’homme] and animal? Her, she doesn’t know, she doesn’t have a man
[d’homme]’’. We understand that she is translating, through humour, the fact
that the ambit of our question rests on a rather simplistic presupposition: that
we all know very well what a man is.
On the whole, and apparently paradoxically, we were demanding the
maximum of kindness in relation to our research, while creating the conditions
for maximum ‘‘recalcitrance’’14: ‘‘your question is not appropriate’’. That is also
why for each one of our demands we insisted on the expression ‘‘you, as a
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raise objections and at the same time to help us. One process recurred
throughout the majority of our interviews: the breeders incessantly uprooted
our question, displaced it, modified its ambit, and when they found the right
way of formulating it, they answered. In other words, they responded to the
question that interested them. ‘‘Difference’’ here takes on a totally unexpected
aspect.
Thus, we often heard this proposition: ‘‘the animal understands us better than
we understand animals’’. More specifically, Manuel Calado Varela states, ‘‘the
animals know what we want but, we, we don’t know what they want’’. This
way of setting up the contrast is anecdotally supported: ‘‘when I open the doors,
the cows know I want them to go out, but I don’t know if they really want to go
out’’, ‘‘in fact, they know us better’’. Several very similar testimonies to these
evoke the fact that animals know us in a manner that is sometimes
incomprehensible for us.
The transformation of the question on which they worked often led the
breeders to privilege the type of question that allowed the issue of the
competences of their animals to be tackled. But behind this choice, another
difference takes shape, a difference which matters: that between farms where
humans and animals talk to each other, make each other propositions, get on
and present modes of subjectivity to each other; and farms where such relations
are rendered impossible. For all our interlocutors, this fact emerges: animals
‘‘pay attention’’ to their breeder and turn out to be passably good translators of
intentions.
The breeding apparatus is an apparatus that creates subjectivities. We found
testimonies to this incessantly.
‘‘It’s a bit like a child who you give a present to every time you visit. And one
day you visit without a present y For example, when we go to see them (the
cows) without changing their field, they don’t take it very well. They will carp.
But me, I say to them ‘I’ve got the names of everyone who is crying!’ How better
to draw the contrast between the sad observation of the industrial farm worker
– if the animals could talk we would get shouted at every day – and what the
breeder Philippe Roucan tells us. In some farms, animals talk, respond and can
even answer back – if only to judge the work of the breeder or indeed to shout at
them. The proof of this is that Bruno Greindl’s cows know that there are ‘limits
not to be crossed. For them in relation to us and us in relation to them; there is a
moment when they will explain to us that that’s enough’. The humour with
which Philippe Roucan replies to his cows’ manifesting their disagreement
marks and accompanies a passage: that of animals into the world of ‘speaking
for speaking’s sake’. This humour sanctions and celebrates the active inversion
of relations, the transgression of categories, the joyous impertinence of the
exchanges proposed. It is there, doubtless, that the offerings of subjectivity find
the opportunity for their best actualization: in the best farms, talk is incessant.
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‘‘We had left for the day, we came back, it was winter, we came back at 7–
7.30 in the evening. Someone calls us saying ‘you have a cow in difficulty, along
by the fence, and she’s having trouble calving’. It was drizzling, there was fog,
the works. I set out with the torch. The cows were spread out over thirteen
hectares, but I knew more or less which area to search in. I go there with the
torch. Suddenly I hear the noise of hooves. The herd had detected me, the entire
herd was on top of me. I say ‘shoo, it’s me’. They recognize me, everyone stops.
For two minutes they stop like that, I talk so they recognize me. I see them turn
around and go off. And I say to them, joking ‘don’t you want to help me look
for Semba?’ And they’ve taken me to the cow. They’ve all made a semi-circle
around us along the fence. They’ve waited there and they’ve taken me to the
cow, who had, effectively, given birth. She couldn’t get up anymore. They knew
why I had come and I think maybe that they must have known I could do
something for her’’.
The talking back and forth, exchanging judgements about intentions is
incessant. Because that is what it’s all about in the constant flood of exchanges,
it seems to me: it’s a matter of incessantly adjusting the intentionalities between
animals and humans – I know that you know what I intend to do. Language is
not limited to creating an overlapping awareness between two speakers
(Hearne, 1994, p. 136); it ‘‘populates’’ each of the beings present with
perspectival propositions, which are so many propositions of intentionalities.
One gives words like one ascribes intentions. This practice, which inscribes the
animal in the world of ‘‘speaking’’ and which contributes to ‘‘populating’’ it,
works to blur the frontiers between humans and animals. One makes say, one
makes ask, one puts oneself in the place of, so as to ‘‘populate with’’. One
doesn’t interpret, one experiments. This does not arise from what is usually
referred back to empathy, but instead to a non-immediate form of knowledge,
which allows the construction of the perspective of those one knows. One does
not put oneself at the place one populates the place with. One doesn’t substitute
one point of view for another; on the contrary, everything is done by the
addition of points of view. Breeders are perspectivists: each perspective is made
up of a translation of intentions.
Moreover, we find this trait again in nearly all the breeders questioned: they
attribute to animals the capacity to attribute intentions to their breeder. It has
been said – we heard it many times – ‘‘animals know what we want better than
we know what they want’’. This possibility of thinking one’s own intentions
from the point of view of the animal that perceives them – what I am calling the
perspectivism of the breeders – largely exceeds the situations in which it is a
matter of reconciling wills even if they are articulated in a certain manner. For
example, Bruno Greindl recounts the dilemma of a charming, chubby little
heifer whom he had attempted to tame. She was part of the herd but we felt we
were tempting her: ‘‘we had the impression that she didn’t want to betray her
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perfectly well that we weren’t bad, but I have the impression that it’s a bit like
the wolf that mocks the dog because the dog has become a friend of humans. I
have the impression that, in the same way, she didn’t want to become too
friendly because otherwise she wouldy’’.
Or when Andre´ Louvigny associates the question of intelligence with the
capacity to understand the intentions of humans: ‘‘that’s what I believe the
intelligence of an animal is. It is being able to enter into situations of which one
isn’t the master but which one enters all the same by having confidence in the
[person] who induces this situation’’.
It seems to me that the situations that we have encountered can be brought
together under the same sign: they are situations of the exchange, and hence
extension, of subjectivities. Breeders adopt perspectives in which they authorize
their animals to think and judge their intentions15 and to respond with their
own intentions. They are all the more perspectivist for recognizing the animal’s
ability, sometimes much better than their own, for adopting the other’s point of
view. These competences are invested in all the more because they doubtless
result from the process that guided the fact of breeding animals – for humans –
and of being bred by humans – for the animals (on this subject see Haraway,
2003, p. 3).
This extension of subjectivities, which breeding situations activate quite
faithfully, resembles what can be called intersubjectivity: becoming what the
other suggests to you, accepting a proposal of subjectivity, acting in the manner
in which the other addresses you, actualizing and verifying this proposal, in the
sense of rendering it true. This is doubtless one of the reasons why in this type of
farm, the question of the difference between animals and humans takes such
unexpected routes and results in shared perspectives, intelligences and
intentions, resemblances, inversions and exchanges of properties between
humans and animals.
But equally one could ask oneself if our particular apparatus didn’t favour the
choice of route taken by the breeders. This hypothesis in fact suggests the need
to envisage the question of apparatuses that activate subjectivity in a broader
manner, by asking if the apparatus of questions that we suggested, with its
insistent demand to construct the question ‘‘as a breeder’’, did not activate some
modes of existence rather than others.
This then would amount to affirming that in the descriptions given to us by
the breeders, cows and pigs became the object of a proposal of subjectivity all
the more rich and extended for our questioning being addressed to breeders ‘‘as
breeders’’. It is true that at the outset this ‘‘as breeders’’ which marked each one
of our demands to put our questions to work had another aim: it was a matter
of underlining the fact that we were addressing ourselves to experts. ‘‘You as a
breeder’’ translated the fact that we were addressing ourselves to a specialist
with expert knowledge of his or her network of practices, occupying the
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think. In this way we started, perhaps a little hastily, from a presupposition: we
assumed that we were all interested in the exchange of what they know and
think.
Now, re-reading these interviews and putting them to the test of the question
of subjectivity and of the creation of the ‘‘we’’, it seems that certain breeders
translated this ‘‘you as a breeder’’ as an invitation to something completely
different to what we proposed: this ‘‘you as breeder’’ is the perspective to
which their manner of conceiving their occupation obliges them. For them,
breeding is not an empty word. It is to help grow (up) and make happy,
even if death, which sometimes renders things paradoxical and difficult, is
at the end of the story. This constant reminder is translated, admitted by the
breeders as a constant reminder of what a particular proposal of subjectivation
sanctions: being the subject of specific practical achievements [pratiques
d’accomplissements].
The term ‘‘breeder’’ is a term that they say designates a particular practice, a
practice that responds to obligations, a practice that engages, a practice that at
the same time creates differences. The people we questioned were often
precise about this difference, by insisting on the fact that the difference between
ways of breeding was, according to them, a more important question than
the question of the comparison of humans and animals. For example,
Andre´ Louvigny contests the generality of the ‘‘as a breeder’’: ‘‘Even among
breeders, there are those who are gentle, competent in their relations with
animals and there are brutes, imbeciles. So there already you have a world.
There are people who feel nothing for their animals. There are people who
look after them properly and there are those who don’t really click’’.
Or Patrick Andre´, who suggests subordinating the question of difference to
that of expectations: ‘‘Personally, I think that one way of tackling it is simply to
ask the question: ‘what do we expect from animals?’ Is the window sufficiently
large to try to examine the difference between humans and animals?’’ He
resumes [the matter] with regard to the question of work: ‘‘I’m not sure that an
industrial farmer expects the same thing from animals as a small holdings
farmer, who has a different approach in the sense that he considers that he must
be in harmony with nature, whilst the former has instead to adapt nature to his
requirements’’.
Philippe Roucan arrives at a similar observation, but the manner in which he
formulates it should make us pay attention: ‘‘Personally, I call breeder (he is
talking to Jocelyne, who he knows well) you agree entirely, us, we are breeders,
the type of farm that we run, call it, say, a family, not run in an extensive way,
like us, with a limited number of animals, well, I think that a breeder is not the
same when he has 100 animals as when he has 10,000 because to my mind he
won’t have the same perception of the animal’’. You agree entirely, us, we are
breeders he says to Jocelyne Porcher. There is a ‘‘we’’ that translates an
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I thought I was offering the posture of an expert in ‘‘knowledge’’ of animals.
That was the ‘‘we’’ that I wished to construct with the breeders, the locus of a
convergence on what could define us, what could interest us. However, despite
my good will, this ‘‘we’’ turned out to have been assumed a little too quickly in
this story. The important thing for the breeders is not to have good knowledge,
but it is to be good breeders.
That is what the animals stood as witnesses for. That is why it is intentions,
expectations, perspectives and exchanges of properties that were privileged in
the way that the breeders responded to us and worked on our questions. They
translate not what cows and pigs are, nor what breeders know of their stock.
They indicate what animals become capable of in the practices through which
the breeders proudly define themselves: bringing into existence animals that
nourish humans in many ways. This includes the nourishing of diverse modes of
existence and becomings of subjectivities, the very thing that governed the
choice of our enquiry.
Translated from the French by Andrew Goffey.
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Notes
1 ‘‘You understood perfectly’’ can be a response to ‘‘what did you say exactly’’. The refusal to say
something else marks something’s existence as a possibility.
2 Vicki Hearne writes, ‘‘the language between people and animals is not fully cultural, each instance
is at least a dialect. Therefore it is difficult to overhear a conversation between a person and an
animal’’ (Hearne, 1994, p. 135). Explaining, in part, why philosophers are so convinced that
animals don’t speak.
3 This contrast appeared to me most clearly when I was having a discussion with a clinician who was
working with associations for drug users who had experienced psychiatric troubles sufficiently
serious for them to have been hospitalized multiple times, and with collectives of homeless people
mobilizing to defend their interests. It is often observed that through their new responsibilities and
their engagement in the movement, the most active members of these associations will engage in
socialization processes that transform them and that can create an increasingly manifest gap
between them and those they represent. This is often signalled by tensions in the groups for which,
paradoxically, they become all the better representers (who – as some people say – are more
presentable) just as they are less representative (Jean-Marie Lemaire, personal communication.
A series of articles on the work of collectives composed of both professionals and uninitiated can
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4 One will recognize here the propositions of Bruno Latour and the importance of his invaluable
work on the question of the spokesperson, translation and regimes of action in the domain of
science studies.
5 On this subject, see Shirley Strum and Linda Fedigan’s exemplary book Primate Encounters (Strum
and Fedigan, 2000). See especially their Introduction ‘‘Changing Views of Primate Society: A
Situated North American View’’, pp. 3–49.
6 The contrast between practices over the question of the point of view of interest to take into
account is clearly drawn here. Behaviourists base themselves on the criterion of conditioning in
order to decree the possibility or impossibility (or interest) of learning something from an animal –
such and such a competence is or isn’t conditionable. It is therefore what interests the researcher
that guides what will be asked. On the other hand, Pepperberg asks herself what, from an animal’s
point of view, will interest it in the fact of talking. Thus, for example, parrot trainers taught the
researcher that parrots have a very acute sense of rivalry. To teach a parrot to talk it is more
effective to pretend, in front of the parrot, to be teaching a human. After a little while, the parrot
will try to better its ‘‘rival’’ by speaking in his/her place. One might note in passing that this casts a
different light on the relationship between philosophers and parrots.
7 We could call it intersubjectivity. The anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod describes intersubjectivity in
her everyday life with the Bedouin. She says, ‘‘I became what I was with them’’.
8 This idea of viewing subjectivity in terms of ‘‘one of us’’ [chez nous] is inspired by a reading of
William James crossed with Jakob von Uexku¨ll, which Stephan Galetic and myself tried out. For
James, the perspective of each philosopher can be translated by the fragment of reality in which
thought can call itself ‘‘at home’’ [chez soi]. His perspectivism is thus defined as a world criss-
crossed by affects and producing affects. Von Uexku¨ll views every animal as subject to the extent
that it accords meanings to its world: whoever creates meanings and therefore creates a world of
meanings is a subject (see Despret and Galetic, 2007).
9 See on this subject the superb work of primatologist Thelma Rowell who decided to put the idea
that sheep are socially stupid to the test in an apparatus that, as Bruno Latour says, gives sheep a
chance. See Rowell (2000) in Strum and Fedigan (2000), pp. 57–71. See also Latour (2000) in the
same collection (pp. 358–382).
10 This investigation was carried out in collaboration with Jocelyne Porcher, a sociologist specializing
in the relations at work in farms. We carried out 23 interviews, some of which brought together a
number of breeders. The interviews were recorded and lasted between two and four hours (nine in
Portugal, eight in France and six in Belgium). The investigation resulted in a joint publication
(Despret and Porcher, 2007).
11 Some of the breeders had already taken part in Jocelyne Porcher’s investigations. They personally
directed us towards other possible participants. For Belgium and Portugal we placed our trust in
those people we had asked to help, for the most part colleagues teaching in agricultural colleges. If
we never specified what we understood by ‘‘interested’’ and ‘‘interesting’’ – which in our experience
doesn’t need to be made explicit (we’ve never been disappointed – quite the contrary in fact) – our
advisors knew straightaway that the farms where animals and humans are happy had a very good
chance of meeting these criteria.
12 In order to ensure clarity in the translation from French to English, we have sometimes intercalated
clauses understood implicitly in the French. Equally, where Despret occasionally plays with the
meanings of words in the French original, we have intercalated that original text. All such
intercalations are indicated with square brackets (translator’s note).
13 In an earlier work I analysed the politeness of questions, designating with this term the capacity
of a question to render the person to whom it is addressed interesting. An impolite question makes
people rather uninteresting, unreflexive and – it is related – uninterested (see Despret, 2002).
14 According to the formulation subsequently given by Bruno Latour to a proposition of Isabelle
Stengers, the notion of ‘‘recalcitrance’’ is amply clarified in Stengers (1993, 1997).
15 The question of judgement turns up again in an intuition common to Jocelyne Porcher, speaking of
the ‘‘judgement of relation’’ accomplished by animals in their work with the breeder, and Vicky
Hearne, notably when she writes ‘‘we call dogs who are not particularly impressed by our
posturing ‘stubborn’ or ‘dominant’, instead of considering the possibility that the dog’s
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